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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explicates the potential role played by type 1 thinking (automatic, fast) 
and type 2 thinking (effortful, logical) in creative thinking. The relevance of Evans 
(2007) models of conflict of dual processes in thinking is discussed with regards to 
creative thinking. The role played by type 1 thinking and type 2 thinking during the 
different stages of creativity (problem finding and conceptualisation, incubation, 
illumination, verification and dissemination) is discussed. It is proposed that although 
both types of thinking are active in creativity, the extent to which they are active and 
the nature of their contribution to creativity will vary between stages of the creative 
process. Directions for future research to test this proposal are outlined; differing 
methodologies and the investigation of different stages of creative thinking are 
discussed.  
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Creativity is usually defined as the production of an idea, act or object that is both 
original and valued (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999). For centuries, there have been accounts 
of creative thinking as subconscious or intuitive and contrasting accounts of creative 
thought as purposeful and deliberative. An archetypal example of the former method 
is the structure of benzene appearing to Kekulé in a dream; an archetypal example of 
the latter method is Michelangelo’s painstaking work on his decoration of the Sistine 
Chapel. However, there has been a lack of an explicit review of what role type 1 
thinking (intuitive and fast) and type 2 thinking (logical and deliberative) play in 
creative thinking. It is our contention that both types of thought must be involved in 
creative thinking in order for creative solutions to be both imaginative and useful. 
As well as defending the role of both forms of thinking in creativity, this paper has 
three aims: explicate which aspects or stages of creative thinking are more likely to 
rely on type 1 thinking and which are more likely to use type 2 thinking; outline how 
the two types of thinking interact in creative thinking, and provide directions for 
future research. 
 
DUAL PROCESS ACCOUNTS OF THINKING 
A classic argument in psychology has been between those who believe thought is 
associative and parallel and those who believe that it is symbolic and sequential 
(Sloman, 1996). One solution to this argument is to suggest that there are two kinds of 
thinking. To address findings that suggest people are prone to poor logical reasoning 
(e.g. Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983) and violations of probability theory (e.g. 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), Evans and Over (1996) distinguished between 
rationality1 and rationality2. Rationality1 involves thinking or behaving in a manner 
which should help to achieve one’s goals, whereas rationality2 involves thinking or 
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behaving according to normative rules (e.g. logic). Evans and Over suggested that, 
while many experiments had found people to be irrational according to the 
characteristics of rationality2, failure to complete experimental tasks correctly could 
often be attributed to participants relying upon rationality1 processes.  
Similarly, Sloman (2002) proposed that type 1 thinking is based on personal 
knowledge and computations based on similarity, while ruled-based computation 
drives type 2 thinking, which is based on language and/or other formal systems. 
However, Evans (2008) pointed out that descriptions of type 1 thinking that focus on 
its associative properties may not be compatible with those that describe it as 
heuristic, implying that not all treatments of dual processing accounts of thinking 
conceptualise type 1 thinking in the same way. It has also been argued that some type 
2 processes can be heuristic (e.g. Carruthers, 2009). For the purpose of our position 
we will use a broad definition of type 1 processes that includes fast, implicit and 
associative processes.  
Evans (2009) has suggested the use of the terms “type 1 processes” and “type 2 
processes”; he has pointed out that Sloman’s (1996) use of the term “systems” 
suggests very specific components of the mind, while Evans and Over’s (1996) 
“systems” are defined at a much more general level. The use of the term “system” 
also implies that there is some cognitive architecture responsible for the different 
types of thinking (Evans, 2009). To avoid ambiguity, and because the assertion of a 
cognitive architecture is unimportant to our arguments, we will refer to type 1 and 2 
processes.  
Stanovich (2009) has suggested that that type 2 thinking can itself be understood as 
comprising the reflective and the algorithmic mind. The algorithmic mind can 
override type 1 thinking to implement analytical thinking, while the reflective mind is 
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responsible for higher goal states and thinking dispositions. Although it would be 
interesting to understand how different individuals’ goals and dispositions drive 
creative thinking, the focus of this paper is the algorithmic mind, as it is concerned 
with how and when type 2 thinking may override type 1 thinking.   
Evans (2007) has described three models of the conflict between automatic (type 1) 
and analytical (type 2) thinking. In the pre-emptive conflict resolution model, the use 
of type 1 or type 2 is chosen at the beginning. It has been asserted that people can 
choose a more cautious and critical or a more “freewheeling” approach to creative 
thinking (e.g. Nickerson, 1999). Klaczynski (2000) proposed a pre-emptive conflict 
resolution model in describing adolescent thought, arguing that choice of either faster 
or more analytical thinking is driven by personal theories (e.g. of social behaviour) 
held by the individual.  
It is questionable if the pre-emptive conflict-resolution model could be applied to 
pressurised conditions, where type 1 might be relied upon without any prior 
deliberation. There is also a lack of specification of how type 1 or 2 thinking is 
chosen. For example, in Klaczynski’s (2000) description of such a model, a 
preconscious (type 1) check occurs to see if information is theory-congruent. Type 1 
or type 2 thinking is then chosen on the basis of this check, thus implying that type 1 
thinking comes first.  
In the parallel-competitive model, both types of thinking operate in parallel to 
produce a response, which sometimes leads to conflict. The idea of type 2 thinking 
operating in parallel with type 1 thinking seems somewhat contradictory to its 
sequential and deliberative nature. However, type 1 thinking may continue after it has 
proposed its first response, by responding to the outcome of type 2 thinking. Sloman 
(2002) has pointed out that certain thinking tasks can cause people to believe two 
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contradictory ideas (one based on type 1 thinking and one based on type 2 thinking) at 
the same time. When people contrast these conflicting ideas, they could be described 
as engaging in a form of dialectical thinking (discussed below). 
Finally, the default-interventionist model posits that type 1 thinking cues automatic 
responses that may be altered by type 2 thinking. This model has been supported by 
Stanovich (1999). In the context of a brief experiment it may be difficult to 
distinguish between a case where type 1 thinking comes first and a case where both 
types of thinking work together for a short period of time, before type 1 thinking 
finishes and type 2 thinking continues its slower processing (E.R. Smith & DeCoster, 
2000). However, in terms of long-term creative work the default-interventionist model 
fits nicely with the idea that type 1 thinking drives problem finding and insight, while 
type 2 thinking works on the elaboration and refining of a creative idea or solution.  
There seems to be little or no consensus over which model of dual process thinking 
is generally preferable. Evans (2007) has suggested that different models may be 
useful for different cognitive processes. Given the complexity of creativity, it may be 
the case that different models of dual process thinking are more or less useful during 
different stages of creative thinking.  
 
DUAL PROCESS THINKING DURING THE STAGES OF CREATIVE 
THINKING  
 
To look more closely at how type 1 and type 2 thinking are involved in creative 
thinking, it is useful to consider the different stages involved in creative thinking. 
There are clear qualitative differences between the stages discussed below, and it is 
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posited here that different types of thinking will be more active during some stages 
than others.  
Various ways of dividing the creative process into stages or steps have been 
suggested. However, Ochse (1990), pointed out that most classic conceptions of 
creativity include similar stages. The stages we deal with are problem finding and 
conceptualisation, incubation, illumination, verification and dissemination.  
 
Problem Finding and Conceptualisation 
Creativity usually begins with the identification (or construction) of a problem. 
“Auditing” of how things work at present using type 2 thinking may help to draw 
attention to what problems exist. For example, critically acclaimed professionals in 
the arts and sciences spent a greater period of time finding a problem on a 
decontextualised task than competent peers (Rostan, 1994). Once the problem has 
been identified, one needs to elaborate on its nature in order to get a sense of what a 
useful and novel solution might look like.   
Research with gifted children by Gallucci, Middleton and Kline (2000) has found a 
positive relationship between a measure of concern over mistakes and personal 
standards and a subscale (Something About Myself) of the Khatena-Torrance Creative 
Perception Inventory (KTCPI) (Khatena & Torrance, 1976). The KTCPI is a 
biographical, self-report measure, so it would be interesting to investigate the 
relationship between perfectionism and tests of creative performance. Perfectionists 
should be more likely to systematically evaluate a current state of affairs, and so rely 
on type 2 thinking to a greater extent when problem finding. 
Perhaps the most explicit empirical contrast between type 1 thinking and type 2 
thinking in relation to problem conceptualisation comes from a study by Ruscio and 
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Amabile (1999). They asked participants to solve a problem after watching one of two 
instructional videos: one gave step-by-step algorithmic instructions (to prime type 2 
thinking) while the other (“heuristic”) video gave the same instructions, but had them 
loosely grouped by functional similarity instead of in the order in which they were to 
be performed (to prime type 1 thinking). Ruscio and Amabile found no difference 
between groups in terms of task completion or instructional information retained. 
However, judges who blind-rated the creativity of products and the closeness of the 
products to those depicted in the video rated the algorithmic group as more creative 
when they followed the video instructions more closely and rated products of the 
heuristic group more highly the more they deviated from the video instructions.  
The design of Ruscio and Amabile’s study is somewhat artificial, as the 
conceptualisation of the problem was given to the participants. Nonetheless, it 
suggests that both types of thinking are useful, and that later stages of creative 
thinking should use the same type of thinking that was relied upon for defining the 
nature of the problem. 
 
Dialectical or Janusian thinking may be useful in facilitating creativity (Benack, 
Basseches, & Swan, 1989; Rothenberg, 1990). Dialectical thinking has been described 
as the simultaneous consideration of two opposite poles of the same idea that are 
brought together to form a synthetic idea (Guignard & Lubart, 2006). The contention 
that dialectical thinking aids creativity has been supported by research by Wu and 
Chiou (2008), who found a positive correlation between dialectical thinking and 
performance on a divergent thinking task in young Taiwanese adults. However, Paletz 
and Peng (2009) found that Asians and Asian-Americans received similar originality 
scores on a test of problem conceptualisation regardless of their tendency towards 
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dialectical thinking, whereas Caucasians displayed a negative relationship between 
dialectical thinking and originality, which suggests that the relationship between 
dialectical thinking and creativity may be culture-specific. Wu and Chiou’s (2008) 
research measured dispositional dialectical thinking; a more experimental approach 
could be useful. 
Although dialectical thinking can be done in a serial, methodical way, it may be 
possible that it occurs at a sub-conscious level. Rothenberg (1990) found that artists 
and scientists that he interviewed were often initially unaware of the role of dialectical 
thinking in their work, but upon further interviewing agreed that their work had been 
inspired by contrasting polar opposites. This would suggest that dialectical thinking 
occurred through type 1 thinking. It may, however, be possible that these ideas about 
dialectical thinking were implanted through the interview process, or that it is simply 
easy to re-interpret creative ideas as arising from the contrast of opposing ideas. 
Further research could also investigate in vivo the use of dialectical thinking in 
creative thinking. For example, notebooks could be searched for examples of 
dialectical thinking to see if such thinking is explicitly expressed during problem 
conceptualisation. 
In contrast to an account prioritising type 1 thinking, it seems plausible that the kind 
of problems described by Sloman (2002), where one believes two contradictory ideas 
at once, each one coming from a different type of thinking, are useful in facilitating 
dialectical thinking. One is aware of the contradiction while at the same time 
appreciating both of the competing ideas. This suggests that the parallel-competitive 
model (Evans, 2007) of dual processes, where both types of thinking operate 
simultaneously, is applicable to dialectical problem conceptualisation.  
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Markman, Lindberg, Kray and Galinsky (2007) found that a counterfactual mindset 
can improve performance on creativity and problem-solving tasks. A counterfactual 
mindset is a cognitive orientation where alternative versions of reality are likely to be 
considered. Specifically, Markman et al. found that additive counterfactual thinking 
(i.e. adding antecedent events to reconstruct reality) improved performance in 
generating novel uses for a brick (a task similar to Alternate Uses; Christensen, 
Guilford, Merrifield, & Wilson, 1960) and also on a Scattergories task which involved 
thinking of words that fit into a particular category (e.g. famous actors) and begin 
with a given letter. In contrast, Markman et al. (2007) found that subtractive 
counterfactual thinking (i.e. subtracting antecedent events to reconstruct reality) 
improved performance on tasks which required less divergent thinking: a version of 
the Remote Associations Task (RAT; Mednick, 1962) and syllogisms,.   
Research by Goldinger, Kleider, Azuma and Bleike (2003) seems to indicate that 
counterfactual thoughts arise automatically, and active thought is required to suppress 
them, consistent with the default-interventionist model (Evans, 2007). Participants 
were required to make mock-jury decisions based on incidents that were altered in 
minor ways so that they either did or did not inspire counterfactual thinking. They 
also had to memorise irrelevant information while making their decisions. Goldinger 
et al. found that participants with poor word span awarded less compensation to the 
victim in the counterfactual scenarios, suggesting that they did not have the type 2 
thinking resources to override the automatic counterfactual thoughts. The use of 
control groups ruled out the possibility that poorer word span is simply correlated 
with a different style of moral reasoning. However, the counterfactual-priming 
scenarios that Goldinger et al. used involved descriptions of unusual decisions that 
would prime subtractive counterfactual thought, so it may still be questionable if 
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additive counterfactual thought arises automatically. It has also been hypothesised 
that counterfactual thinking is characteristic of dreams (McNamara, 2000), and this 
may help people to simulate alternative ways of dealing with difficult situations 
(McNamara, Andresen, Arrowood, & Messer, 2002).  
 
Feldhusen (2006) has emphasised the role of prior knowledge in understanding a 
creative task by suggesting that clarification of the problem occurs through relating 
the problem to similar tasks in one’s knowledge base. Research has not found robust 
evidence for the hypothesis that the flexibility of divergent thinking is related to the 
breadth of one’s knowledge base (Scott, 1997). It may be the case that while having a 
large number of examples of problems in one’s memory can help to understand the 
problem, it may lead to a solution based on synthesis or the application of a 
predictable solution, rather than more radical novelty. Experts tend to have a greater 
amount of automaticity in their thinking, and so are less dependent on working 
memory and serial processing (VanLehn, 1989). This would seem to suggest that the 
degree to which type 2 thinking is necessary will depend upon the level of one’s 
knowledge in the area where a creative solution is required. For example, an 
experienced film director should be able to decide on how to film a scene with less 
step-by-step, analytical thinking than a novice.  
Although Sternberg (2006) argued that experts should typically approach tasks in a 
more systematic way, this argument could be accommodated by suggesting that while 
behaviourally more systematic, the performance of experts is not necessarily step-by-
step at a cognitive level; a systematic method has become automatic for them. 
Notwithstanding the problems outlined above with the pre-emptive conflict resolution 
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model (Evans, 2007), experts may simply be better at choosing type 1 or type 2 
thinking when approaching a task.  
 
Incubation 
A typical account of the incubation stage of creative thinking is that one stops 
thinking of a problem for a while, and a new insight is available when one returns to 
the problem (Stokes, 2007). It is typically hypothesised that the unconscious mind 
works on the task at hand during incubation (S.M. Smith & Dodds, 1999). Ellwood, 
Pallier, Snyder and Gallate (2009) found that, when generating ideas, performance 
was strongest when participants worked on an unrelated task during a break, rather 
than working on a similar task during the break or having no break at all. This would 
seem to support the idea that leaving a problem aside for a while can facilitate 
creative thinking. Similarly, three experiments by Dijksterhuis and Meurs (2006) 
indicated that people who did an unrelated distractor task came up with more 
divergent ideas than those who were given time to think consciously about the 
question or had to answer immediately, although the authors’ definition of divergent 
thinking was rather arbitrary in Experiment 1 (coming up with names for new pastas 
that didn’t end in “i”; this ignored other potential factors that could indicate divergent 
thinking, such as if the proposed new names did not sound like existing pasta names 
in other ways,).  
S.M. Smith and Dodds (1999) identified a number of different theories to explain 
incubation effects, not all of which suggest unconscious processes. Theories include 
recovery from fatigue, forgetting inappropriate mental sets and opportunistic 
assimilation (assimilating chance environmental events into one’s thoughts by being 
alert to potentially useful clues or analogies). The latter explanation was supported by 
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Simonton (1995), who suggested that the idea of opportunistic assimilation is 
supported by the innovation of thinkers with numerous professional contacts and 
varied projects. 
Research that has involved participants working on another task during a break from 
the main task (e.g. Penney, Godsell, Scott, & Balsom, 2004) has not tended to support 
the idea that incubation is simply due to recovery from fatigue. Research by Sio and 
Rudowicz (2007) showed no evidence for the idea that inappropriate mental sets are 
forgotten, but instead supported the spreading activation hypothesis (S.M. Smith, 
1995), which suggests that activation spreads to the relevant nodes during incubation. 
If so, this would suggest that associative, implicit processes are actively at work 
during the incubation period. 
Segal (2004) challenged the idea that the unconscious mind is at work on a task 
during incubation, and argued that incubation simply allows one to organise the 
problem in a new way. This was supported by research indicating that the length of a 
break, which began once the participant had reached an impasse, did not affect insight 
problem-solving (Segal, 2004). Insight problems are those that require some kind of 
new or unfamiliar response, involving a change in one’s view of the problem, in order 
to find the solution (Dominowski, 1995). However, Segal’s findings could be 
interpreted as an indication that type 1 thinking works quite quickly during 
incubation, and that the short break was long enough for type 1 thinking processes to 
work out the solution.  
A meta-analytic review by Sio and Ormerod (2009) analysed a number of potential 
mediators that could potentially explain the inconsistent findings from the incubation 
literature on whether or not unconscious processes account for incubation. Sio and 
Ormerod found that the use of low demand tasks during the incubation period was 
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beneficial; the authors acknowledge that this could mean that high demand tasks are 
less beneficial as they do not allow covert conscious thought about the main problem 
during the incubation period. This would in turn undermine some of the evidence that 
unconscious processes underlie incubation, as it suggests that participants are actually 
still reasoning about creativity tasks while doing irrelevant distracter tasks.  
 
Whether or not the unconscious mind is active during incubation, it seems unlikely 
that type 2 thinking is involved. Indeed, the greater the type 2 thinking resources one 
has at one’s disposal, the less likely one is to go through incubation, as one will be 
more likely to find a creative solution through serial processing. Davidson (1995) 
found that participants with a lower I.Q. benefited more from the provision of cues 
when solving insight problems, which suggests that these participants may have 
reached the impasse that leads to the stage of incubation. Although it was also 
observed that individuals with a higher I.Q. were more likely to make sudden 
realisations, Davidson did not suggest that this was due to less intelligent participants 
solving the problems in a more step-by-step manner. Instead, it seems plausible that 
less intelligent individuals were more likely to overestimate their closeness to 
reaching a solution, meaning that the more intelligent participants were more aware of 
the suddenness of insights when they occurred.  
 
Illumination 
Inspiration or illumination would seem to be reliant upon type 1 thinking, which is 
described as intuitive and associational. Weisberg (2006) has pointed out that insight 
(i.e. where the solution becomes suddenly obvious following a period of frustrated 
effort) is typically seen as defying logic in problem-solving, as it does not follow from 
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the individual’s prior thoughts. An interesting piece of research by Schooler, Ohlsson 
and Brooks (1993) seems to support this. They found that participants who, during an 
interruption in insight problem-solving, verbalised their thinking strategies performed 
worse than controls who engaged in an unrelated activity during the interruption.  
However, Sawyer (2006) has highlighted the effort that goes into most creative 
works. Sawyer has used the example of the work of professional authors (and their 
editors) to emphasise the importance of the process of perfecting a creative work, and 
suggested that the “visionary” image of the creator, and thus the emphasis on type 1 
thinking, is culturally and historically specific.   
Ball and Stephens (2009), in studying the completion of insight problems, employed 
a methodology that contrasts thinking aloud with articulatory suppression (AS), a 
condition where an irrelevant word or phrase (in this case, repeating a number 
sequence) is repeatedly articulated. The idea was that AS would use up working 
memory resources, so that if insight requires these resources (which would suggest 
that it is a type 2 thinking-driven process) then insight problem-solving will be 
impaired by AS. If insight does not require working memory resources (in other 
words, if it is implicit or type 1 thinking-driven) then AS should not have an effect. 
Ball and Stephens found that AS impaired insight problem-solving relative to a 
control group for easy tasks and relative to both the control group and the thinking 
aloud group for more difficult tasks. This suggests that type 2 thinking is required. 
Finke (1995) drew a distinction between divergent insight and convergent insight, 
based on divergent and convergent thinking (Guilford, 1956; Mednick, 1962). Insight 
problems (i.e. those that are likely to involve sudden insight) tend to involve 
convergent insight, where a structure is found that makes sense of ostensibly 
unrelated elements. Divergent insight, on the other hand, occurs when one finds novel 
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uses or implications for an existing structure, and is probably more common in 
various forms of art. Much of the research on insight uses insight problems rather than 
more open-ended tasks that would require divergent insight, and so has arguably only 
investigated one kind of insight.  
 
Boden (1994) posited that dimensions of a conceptual space within a domain are 
defined by the domain’s principles, which define a set of possibilities. Progress in 
creativity stems from explorations of the conceptual space (or mental representations 
thereof) that lead to changes in the dimensions of conceptual space. A clear example 
would be in music, where 19
th
 and 20
th 
century composers increased the number of 
modulations that were possible in compositions (Boden, 1994). Type 2 thinking could 
be useful in outlining the parameters of a creative domain, and deciding how to 
extend them. 
A similar account, also based on mental representations, has been posited by Byrne 
(2005). Problems that typically involve a moment of insight just before one solves 
them are often represented in a limited way. For example, when completing the nine-
dot problem, one may represent the four lines as staying within the square formed by 
the dots. The moment of insight occurs when an aspect of the problem’s mental 
representation that was previously unchangeable is altered. Byrne argued that 
reasoning about what might have happened is a form of imagination, so perhaps 
inspiration can derive from type 2 thinking. Although the findings of Goldinger et al. 
(2003) seem to suggest that such thought can arise automatically, the application of 
these thoughts to a problem may involve deliberative reasoning.  
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Gilhooly and Murphy (2005) investigated if problems that require insight were 
solved more easily by people who scored higher on tests of working memory and 
executive function, which the authors used as an indirect measure of type 2 thinking. 
Their results indicated that participants who scored higher on tests of figural fluency 
and alternative uses (described as measures of executive function) did significantly 
better on insight problems. However, there was no significant effect on insight 
problem-solving for performance on most of the tests of working memory. As the 
authors point out, as well as measuring executive function, figural fluency and 
alternative uses also measure cognitive flexibility, which may require the parallel 
processing of type 1 thinking, so it is difficult to say if their findings clarify if type 2 
thinking plays a role in insight problem-solving. As insight problems (with the 
solutions known to the researchers) were used by Gilhooly and Murphy (2005), 
divergent insight (Finke, 1995) was not measured, and so their research may not be 
relevant to the kind of creativity discussed by authors such as Boden (1994).  
 
Verification 
Ideas are often expanded during verification, so there is still a role for type 1 
thinking to play.  The creative thinker may also be concerned with whether or not a 
creative product has “intuitive” appeal, and so may fall back on type 1 thinking. When 
critiquing a new strategy, one may imagine different ways in which the strategy might 
play out (Nickerson, 1999), and one may use associative thought for this purpose. 
When verifying a solution that has already begun to be implemented, counterfactual 
thinking may be useful. This may arise automatically, at least if it involves subtractive 
counterfactual thought (see discussion of Goldinger et al.’s [2003] study above), 
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although it may need to be appraised by type 2 thinking, consistent with the default-
interventionist hypothesis (Evans, 2007). 
 
It is more obvious that verification should involve type 2 thinking. Type 2 thinking 
is described as deliberate, and in order for verification to happen the thinker must 
check through the creative “product” for flaws. One needs to evaluate the strengths 
and weaknesses of one’s thoughts so that the best ideas can be chosen for further 
progress (Guignard & Lubart, 2006). Reasoned evaluation is necessary to ensure that 
original ideas are useful, rather than just bizarre (Runco, 2006). 
 
Dissemination 
Following verification, thinkers are satisfied with the intrinsic quality of their 
creative solutions. However, they will usually want to make their work known to 
others. Simonton (e.g. 1988) has contended that creativity requires persuasion and 
social influence. In other words, a creative act can only be fully creative if it reaches 
an audience. Although social persuasion as a requirement or essential aspect of 
creativity has been challenged (e.g. Johnson-Laird, 1988; Nickerson, 1999), many 
tasks requiring creative thought (e.g. problems with national infrastructure) will not 
be successfully dealt with until the idea for the solution has been disseminated. 
Associative thinking may be useful in thinking of novel ways to make others aware 
of one’s creative ideas. During dissemination, the development of ideas may be 
influenced by the social reaction to one’s work. Amabile (1996) described how the 
poet Anne Sexton worried that winning a grant cheapened her work, and how she 
warned a fellow writer not to let an award he had won lead to complacency. Step-by-
step verification may take place when creative thinkers use others’ responses to their 
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work to evaluate its usefulness. A particularly strong example of the effect of social 
reaction on creativity is a “high-stakes performance” (Gardner, 1994), which involves 
carrying out actions in public in order to cause social or political change. The details 
of such performances have to be developed in response to the reactions of people or 
institutions that are targeted as an audience. Although some small insight presumably 
comes before the performance, dissemination is given temporal precedence in 
Gardner’s outline of the high-stakes performance.   
Although a role can be given to both types of thinking in dissemination, a more 
socially-orientated account may be needed to fully explain the success of a creative 
idea. Csikszentmihalyi (1988) proposed a dynamic model of the creative process in 
which the creative person interacts with the domain (the symbolic system of the 
culture in which the creative act is embedded) and the field (the group of people who 
affect the structure of the domain). This model could be used to give a more 
comprehensive account of why some creative solutions are more influential than 
others. For example, whether an idea is accepted by the relevant field as creative or 
not is often related to the values of the decision-makers within that field rather the 
intrinsic quality of the work (Runco, 2006). Nonetheless, thinkers with expertise in 
their domain should be able to fit their work to the tastes of the field, if they choose. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Discussion 
This paper contends that both type 1 and type 2 thinking are active at all stages of 
creative thinking, with the possible exceptions of incubation (for which type 1 
thinking may be responsible). Despite anecdotal evidence to the contrary (e.g. great 
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ideas appearing, fully-formed, in dreams), it is unlikely that highly creative solutions 
can be carried out in full without type 2 thinking.  
Policastro (1999) has suggested that the creative process begins with vague, 
impressionistic thoughts that gradually become more explicated. This is similar to the 
default interventionist model (Evans, 2007), with semi-conscious ideas from type 1 
thinking being tested and refined by type 2 thinking. Runco (2006) has taken a less 
sequential view, arguing that creative thinking is a simultaneous, coherent process 
rather than a series of discrete stages. This makes intuitive sense; for example, 
conceptualisation can often be an arduous task, and “later” stages may be drawn upon 
in outlining the nature of the problem. Similarly, Brophy (1998) argued that a full 
process of creative thinking should involve alternating between convergent evaluation 
and divergent ideation. Such descriptions of the stages of creativity are probably more 
in line with the parallel competitive model (Evans, 2007), where both types of 
thinking operate simultaneously. Arguments like these do not contradict the existence 
of the stages discussed above; they simply challenge the idea that the creative thinker 
finishes one stage completely before progressing to the next.  
A synthesis of the default interventionist model and the parallel competitive model, 
based on time frame of creative thinking, is possible. During work on a brief task or a 
small section of a longer task (these are more likely to be investigated using 
experimental methods), the default interventionist model applies, as a short period of 
associative thought is followed by a quick verification of one’s idea using sequential 
processing. During work on long creative projects (the kind of problem that is more 
likely to be investigated using case study methods), the parallel competitive model 
applies, as one moves between the stages of creative thinking, alternating between 
type 1 and type 2 thinking. 
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DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 
 
Although much of the research discussed here has only indirectly dealt with the 
issue of dual processes of thinking in creative thinking, it should be possible to 
employ various methodologies to empirically study this field.  
 
Runco and Sakamoto (1999) argued that an experimental approach to creative 
thinking is useful because of the complexity of creativity; other variables can be 
controlled for. However, they acknowledge that control may come at the cost of the 
spontaneity of creative thought. This could be particularly problematic for the area of 
dual processes in creative thinking, as it suggests that the experimental situation could 
encourage participants to engage in more type 2 thinking than they would in the 
course of everyday thinking. 
Stanovich and West (1998) found that people’s performance on one task which 
induces a conflict between type 1 and 2 thinking (e.g. syllogisms where there is a 
conflict between the logically correct conclusion and a conclusion based on prior 
belief) will tend to be modestly but significantly correlated with performance on 
another such task, indicating that there are systematic individual differences in the 
tendency to use type 2 thinking. It could thus be possible to compare performance on 
creative tasks between those who are prone to type 2 thinking and people who are less 
so.  
Participants are more likely to rely upon type 1 thinking when time constraints are 
used (e.g. Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005). Although time constraints can be easily 
applied in the laboratory, external validity need not be totally sacrificed; time 
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constraints often occur in the real world, perhaps particularly in organisational 
settings. Those working in the advertising world will be familiar with time constraints 
on creative thinking; they could potentially be a good target population. 
 
Think-aloud protocols, while useful for developing a narrative account of a process 
(van Someren, Barnard, & Sandberg, 1994), may exaggerate the role of type 2 
thinking. This is because it may be the case, as Evans and Over (1996) have 
suggested, that the outcome of type 1 thinking is available to conscious thinking, but 
the workings of type 1 thinking are not. Given the serial nature of think-aloud 
protocols, they may not be able to identify parallel processes; eye tracking may be 
more useful (Evans, 2007). However, similar to the experimental findings of 
Stanovich & West (1998), analysis of think-aloud protocols have suggested some 
possible individual differences in the use of type 1 and type 2 thinking; Khandwalla 
(1993) identified the cognitive styles “intuitive ideator” and “anxious analyst” from 
protocols of a divergent thinking task. In an experimental context, thinking aloud may 
be useful for identifying if type 2 thinking is being used when contrasted with 
articulatory suppression (Ball & Stephens, 2009). Think-aloud protocols also have an 
advantage over more autobiographical measures in that they do not suffer from 
problems of trying to remember how one thought in the past.  
Despite the problems with (auto)biographical methods, a case study approach may 
also prove useful; it could allow for increased external validity by looking at work on 
a project over an extended period of time (Gruber & Wallace, 1999). This could be 
particularly useful in observing problem finding, where people may spend years 
“going through the motions” within their field before finding a truly important 
problem. Although this paper has mostly focused on the general process of creative 
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thinking, the case study approach can be very useful in studying instances of 
exceptional creativity, which may employ the two types of thinking in different ways. 
For example, type 2 thinking may be used more extensively during exceptionally 
creative thought, as the evaluation of the verification stage may last for a longer 
period of time.  
  
Investigating specific stages of creative thinking 
If the objective of a task is fully and explicitly stated then research participants will 
not have to think of how the task itself could be improved. Thus, to investigate 
problem finding and conceptualisation, the use of ambiguous tasks is necessary. For 
example, Reiter-Palmon, Mumford, O’Connor Boes and Runco (1997) devised 
problems relating to everyday life for university students. One task describes a student 
who was having trouble deciding whether or not to pursue postgraduate studies. 
Participants are asked what they would do in this situation. Although this task may be 
useful for investigating how people conceptualise problems, it does not require them 
to find a problem, as the problem is already evident. A task for investigating problem 
finding would ideally present a scenario that is not evidently problematic (e.g. 
advertising an unusual product: one can advertise it using standard techniques, or one 
can find a problem that the product ameliorates).  Asking participants to devise 
problem restatements can be used to measure overall quality as well as fluency and 
originality of problem construction but is somewhat artificial, as it encourages a focus 
on goals at the expense of restrictions or information needed (Reiter-Palmon & 
Robinson, 2009).  
The study of insight should ideally not rely solely on insight problems (i.e. those 
involving an “aha” moment). Insight problems have a tendency to present information 
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so as to lead the problem solver into a limited conceptualisation of the problem that 
will make it almost impossible to solve (Segal, 2004). Creative acts in real life are not 
constructed in advance (although thinkers may themselves decide to follow an 
unfruitful approach), so sudden insight outside the lab (e.g. in the arts) should also be 
studied.  
Research on verification should focus on solutions that participants themselves 
propose rather than a novel solution provided by the researcher. Ideas that participants 
have not come up with themselves may encourage different approaches to 
verification; participants may not have access to the process used to generate the 
researcher’s idea or may be artificially uncritical in order to please the researcher. If it 
is the case that participants do not know how the idea was generated, they may be 
more inclined to use associative processes to imagine how the idea was generated 
rather than using more deliberatively critical processes to critique the processes 
through which the idea was generated.  
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Table 1: Potential roles of type 1 and type 2 thinking during different stages of 
creative thinking 
 
Stage Type 1 thinking Type 2 thinking 
Problem conceptualisation Dialectical thinking Dialectical thinking  
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Counterfactual thoughts Counterfactual reasoning  
“Auditing”  
Incubation Unconscious processes May remove need for this 
stage 
Illumination Associative thinking Counterfactual reasoning 
Exploring conceptual 
spaces 
Verification Further development of 
ideas 
Step-by-step checking of 
ideas 
Dissemination Generating methods of 
dissemination 
Appraisal of others’ 
response to one’s ideas 
 
